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INTRODUCTION 
Sovereign default is a paradox in and of itself.  This is primarily 
because of the undeniable State power over creditors, but also because 
creditors would need to overcome a State’s sovereignty to secure their 
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rights.1  Prior to the Second World War, so long as creditors were not 
nationals of the defaulting State and their national State was willing to 
pursue or force the return of investments through diplomatic or military 
means, creditors would rely on diplomatic protection by their nation 
State to secure their rights.2  Indicatively, the Drago Porter Convention 
of 1907 provided States should first attempt to peacefully arbitrate 
claims arising from sovereign indemnity before resorting to military 
means.3  If creditors’ national States were unwilling or unable to assist 
in the creditors’ claims, lenders were left without recourse, other than 
negotiating an acceptable settlement by trying to assert pressure on the 
State through the threat of denial of future lending.4 
Resorting to litigation was not an option available for creditors 
because States enjoyed absolute immunity from suits in national 
courts.5  This essentially rendered it impossible for a creditor to find a 
venue to pursue his claims, outside of the defaulting State’s courts.6  
Using the defaulting State’s courts provided little comfort to creditors.7  
However, following 1945, several studies suggest creditors began to 
shift away from this approach, and more sovereign default cases were 
brought before national courts.8  This is partially because it became 
common practice for States to waive, in advance, their right to claim 
immunity from jurisdiction in the terms of issuance.9  Additionally, 
developments in international law widely recognized challenges against 
States in national courts.10  That stated, the issue of enforcement of a 
foreign judgment against a State is still a thorny issue and, 
                                                          
1. KENNETH H.F. DYSON, STATES DEBT & POWER: ‘SAINTS’ & ‘SINNERS’ IN 
EUROPEAN HISTORY & INTEGRATION 240 (2014).   
2. MAX WINKLER, FOREIGN BONDS: AN AUTOPSY 146 (1999).  
3. DYSON, supra note 1, at 240.  
4. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 67, 68 (2014).  
5. Id.; see also NORBERT GAILLARD, WHEN SOVEREIGNS GO BANKRUPT: A 
STUDY ON SOVEREIGN RISK 13 (2014).  
6. Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 68.  
7. Id.  
8. See Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch, & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign 
Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976 – 2010, 2 (Feb. 13, 2013) 
(working paper) (on file with SSRN Electronic Journal).  
9. Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 69. 
10. See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).  
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unsurprisingly, it is a long-standing belief in international 
macroeconomics that sovereign debt cannot be enforced.11 
Hence, claiming and enforcing investors’ rights against sovereign 
states is not an easy task.  Indeed, unlike insolvency of other entities, 
there isn’t any uniform legal framework regulating insolvency of 
sovereign States.  Therefore, there is a regulatory vacuum not only in 
relation to substantive law, but also on enforcement. 
This Article will address investors’ rights in case of sovereign 
default from a contractual perspective and examine whether the legal 
framework available for breach of contract suffices to provide an 
efficient and complete framework for the satisfaction of investors’ 
claims in case of sovereign default.  This Article will primarily focus 
on the Greek bonds’ restructuring of 2012, but will draw wider 
conclusions for bondholders’ protection. 
First, the Article examines the legal nature of sovereign bonds.  
Second, it reviews the applicable laws including: national law as it 
applies to state contracts, international law, choice of law, and lex fori. 
Third, it covers the basic contractual clauses including: “pari passu,” 
collective action clauses, events of default clauses, other clauses, and 
waiver of immunity, while examining the development of these 
contractual terms in an attempt to better safeguard bondholders’ rights. 
I. THE LEGAL NATURE OF SOVEREIGN BONDS 
The legal nature of sovereign bonds can be difficult to define.  
Bonds can be understood in a number of ways, including as 
investments, capital rising tools, financial instruments, and on balance-
sheet debt security.12  Additionally, sovereign bonds can take several 
forms, including inter alia, conventional bonds, convertible bonds, 
zero-coupon bonds, and floating rate notes.13  To better evaluate 
sovereign bonds’ legal nature, it is best to review how these bonds are 
issued, and the modus by which, they are offered to the public. 
                                                          
11. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial 
Crises, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 466, 466−72 (2009). 
12. STEFAN WEBER, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO BONDS 29 (Hans van Houte et 
al. eds., 1999).  
13. For an analysis of the features of each bond instrument see MOORAD 
CHOUDHRY, HANDBOOK OF FINANCE 276−78 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2008).  
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Generally, the legal framework regulating the issuance of bonds is 
different in each State.14  An international bond market exists, which 
illustrates several similarities in the bond-issuance process set by such 
frameworks.  Specifically, within the Eurozone, the process followed 
for the issuance of sovereign bonds by Member States is largely 
similar.15  Such process can be broken down in roughly three phases: 
pre-issuance, issuance, and closing. 
In the pre-issuance phase, following the legal documentation and 
prospectus preparation for a new bond, the issuer selects a Lead 
Manager, likely an investment bank, which undertakes to approach and 
negotiate with prospective underwriters for the syndicate formation.16  
The involvement of a Lead Manager is necessary because States do not 
have their own banking facilities.17  At this stage, the Issuer would also 
proceed to announce the new issue and would send formal invitations, 
along with the preliminary Offering Circular and timetable, to 
prospective underwriters to take part in the syndicate.18  Normally, the 
underwriters would be investment banks, commercial banks, or a 
combination of institutional investors.19  Following the announcement, 
and in line with the timetable provided, the Lead Manager would liaise 
with other underwriters to form a Managing Group.20  Then, that 
Managing Group would negotiate and finalize the issuance’s terms with 
the issuer.21  Next, the syndicate would need to accept or reject the 
finalized issuance terms within approximately twenty-four hours.22 
                                                          
14. See Hans-Joachim Dübel, Partial Sovereign Bond Insurance by the 
Eurozone: A More Efficient Alternative to Blue (Euro-)bonds, 252 CTR. FOR EUR. 
POL’Y STUD. 1, 3 (2011).  
15. Id. at 2. 
16. Although notably a large number of countries no longer use syndicates, 
countries have been replaced syndicates with auctions. See G.J. Schinasi & R.T. 
Smith, Fixed-Income Markets in the United States, Europe and Japan: Some Lessons 
for Emerging Markets (IMF, Working Paper No. 98/173, 1998).  
17. See EDWIN BORCHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLE, VOL. 1, 45 (1951). 
18. MOORAD CHOUDHRY, THE BOND & MONEY MARKETS: STRATEGY, 
TRADING, ANALYSIS 386–87 (2001).  
19. Id. at 383. 
20. Id.  
21. Id. at 386–87. 
22. Id.  
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The issuance stage follows.  If the terms are accepted, the Syndicate 
will enter into a Subscription Agreement with the Issuer, which 
contains all the details pertaining to the issuance.23  Once the 
Subscription Agreement is entered into, the underwriting syndicate (i.e. 
the syndicate members that agreed to underwrite the bonds offered at 
the issuance) would “underwrite” the bonds by guaranteeing the Issuer 
a payment of the previously agreed price for the shares.24  The Lead 
Manager would notify the underwriting syndicate members of their 
allotments, and then the final Offering Circular would be distributed.25 
Following this, at the closing stage, members of the selling group 
offer the bonds in the secondary market, which are usually sold over the 
counter,26 and the underwriting syndicate must pay the Issuer that 
agreed amount.  Hence, despite the legal framework’s complexity and 
the many intermediaries that exist during the bond issuance process, we 
can summarize that bonds are generally treated as loan contracts 
between the issuer and the subscriber.27  They are transferrable debt 
securities issued to the initial subscribers.28  Then the subscriber 
acquires the bonds and provides medium or long-term financing to the 
issuer in exchange for payment of the nominal amount plus interest 
upon maturity.29  This is confirmed by the language found in several 
sovereign bonds when referring to the bonds’ status stipulating: “The 
Notes constitute direct, unconditional, unsubordinated and unsecured 
obligations of the Issuer.”30 
                                                          
23. Id.  
24. SHELAGH HEFFERNAN, MODERN BANKING 560 (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
eds., 2005). 
25. CHOUDHRY, supra note 18, at 387.  
26. See So Why do Bonds Trade OTC?, INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N., 
https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/Secondary-
Markets/Bond-Market-Transparency-Wholesale-Retail/So-why-do-bonds-trade-
OTC-/ (last visited May 22, 2018).  
27. WEBER, supra note 12, at 29.  
28. PHILIP R. WOOD, INTERNATIONAL LOANS, BONDS, GUARANTEES, LEGAL 
OPINIONS 193 (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
29. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON’S FINANCE & 
INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 12 (Barron’s Educational Series, 7th ed. 2003).  
30. See, e.g., THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC, Greek Offering Circular (Apr. 10, 
2014), https://ftalphaville-cdn.ft.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Greece-Final-
Offering-Circular-dated-10-April-2014.pdf. 
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For this Article’s purposes, the closing stage is the only relevant 
stage, as this is the time sovereign bonds are granted to investors.  
Sovereign bonds are usually issued to investors by virtue of the 
following legal documents: (1) a fiscal agency agreement or trust 
agreement, (2) a contract that entails the terms and conditions 
applicable to the bonds; (3) a prospectus disclosing the necessary 
information under applicable legislation in relation to the bonds’ issue, 
as well the issuer and the country itself; and (4) a registration 
statement.31 
Therefore, the relationship between the issuer and bondholder is 
contractual.  Hence, we will particularly examine the law applicable to 
State contracts and sovereign bonds to explore bondholders’ rights 
under such contracts.  Applicable law is of the utmost importance to 
determine investors’ rights in case of sovereign default.32  International 
investment law regulates both substantive and procedural issues and, as 
will be demonstrated, can be a powerful weapon either in the State or 
investor’s hands.  For these reasons, it is one of the “most sensitive legal 
issues.”33 
II. APPLICABLE LAW 
To determine applicable law governing the relation between the 
State and the investor(s), we must first explore how this relation was 
created.  Specifically, we must consider the legal basis for the relation.  
As already stipulated, for bond issuances cases, the underlying 
relationship between investors and the issuing State stems from 
sovereign bond contracts. 
                                                          
31. Catalin Stefanescu, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign 
Bond Contracts and Their Effect on Spreads at Issuance, EUR. FIN. MGMT. ASSOC. 1, 
10 (2016), http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL% 
20MEETINGS/2016-Switzerland/papers/EFMA2016_0442_fullpaper.pdf. 
32. See Committee on Foreign & Comparative Law, Governing Law in 
Sovereign Debt – Lessons from the Greek Crisis and Argentina Dispute of 2012, 1 
N.Y.C. BAR (Feb. 2013), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072390-
GoverningLawinSovereignDebt.pdf.   
33. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 81 (2d ed. 2008).  
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The legal treatment of State contracts has been extensively 
discussed.34  Although opposite views have been expressed,35 
generally, State contracts are treated differently than ordinary 
commercial contracts between non-state entities.36  These differences 
exist because strong public policy considerations are usually applied in 
State contracts, and a State differs from any other contractual party due 
to its exorbitant powers.37  These considerations are often interpreted in 
the application of public law, specifically, administrative law;38 and the 
exercise of a State’s discretion on the negotiation, conclusion, 
operation, and termination of such contracts.39  Although different 
States may regulate State contracts differently within their national law, 
the distinction between ordinary commercial contracts between private 
parties and State contracts are nonetheless recognized universally in 
several national legal systems.40 
Hence, the question of which law applies to such contracts is one 
that raises questions amongst scholars and arbitral tribunals, with 
various theories coming forward.  According to such theories, we can 
distinguish between the following laws that can apply to State contracts: 
national law, international law, the law chosen by the parties, and lex 
fori. 
                                                          
34. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, State Contracts, U.N. 
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11 
 (2004).  
35. See, e.g., PHILIP R. WOOD, CONFLICT OF LAWS & INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
60 (2007) (where it is stipulated that “there are no special rules applying to State 
commercial contracts”).  
36. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 34, at 5.  
37. Patrick R. Wautelet, International Public Contracts: Applicable Law and 
Dispute Resolution, U. LIÈGE (2015), https://orbi.uliege.be/bitstream/2268/136404/ 
1/Wautelet%20-%20Applicable%20Law%20(final).pdf. 
38. Charles Leben, La théorie du contratd’etat et l’évolution du droit 
international des investissements 302 Le RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE [R.C.A.D.I.] 197 (2003) (Fr.).  
39. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 34, at 5.  
40. Id.; see also COLIN TURPIN, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS (1972). But see 
WOOD, supra note 35 (arguing State contracts entered into between a sovereign 
government and non-state entity, should not be treated fundamentally differently than 
private contracts).  
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A.  National Law as Applicable to State Contracts 
Several scholars support the application of national law in State 
contracts, absent a “choice of law provision” to the contrary.41  This 
opinion was reinstated by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
in its early case concerning The Payment of Various Serbian Loans 
Issued in France, where the Court ruled:42 
Any contract which is not a contract between States in their capacity 
as subjects of international law is based on the municipal law of some 
country. The question as to which this law is forms the subject of that 
branch of law which is at the present day usually described as private 
international law or the doctrine of the conflict of laws.43 
Accordingly, the law applicable to State contracts would be the State 
host’s law.44 
There are various reasons to support such a claim.  According to 
the gravity test, a contract is governed by the law, which the contract is 
most closely connected to.45  For example, in a sovereign bond 
agreement, the issuer’s country is most likely the place where: the 
bonds will be issued, the agreement will be signed and delivered, the 
funds will be remitted to, and where they will be repaid.46  Hence, the 
issuing State’s law should also be applicable.47  Additionally, a 
                                                          
41. See F.V. Garcia Amador, Fourth Rep. on State Responsibility, U.N. DOC. 
A/CN.4/119, at 126 (1959); F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 302 
(Oxford U. Press eds., 1973).  
42. Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France 
(Fr. v. Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes), Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 20, at 41 (July 12).  
43. Id.  
44. HEGE ELISBETH KJOS, APPLICABLE LAW IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 172 (Vaughan Lowe 
QC eds., 2013); see also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73–79 
(Stevens eds., 1957) (discussing the conflict of laws criteria used by international 
Courts and Tribunals).  
45. OLIVER J. ARMAS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN 
NEW YORK 91 (James H. Carter & John Fellas eds., 2d ed. 2013). 
46. Davidson Sommers et al., Conflict Avoidance in International Loan and 
Monetary Agreements, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463, 466 (1956).  
47. TONY COLE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: THE SOURCES OF 
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 223 (Tarcisio Gazzini & Eric De Brabandere eds., 2012).   
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sovereign bond agreement is very closely related to the State’s financial 
interests.48  Furthermore, applying the law of the issuing State is in line 
with the notion of sovereignty.49  In fact, the Committee established by 
the League of Nations to study international law contracts concluded: 
“every contract which is not an international agreement—i.e. a treaty 
between States—is subject (as matters now stand) to municipal law.”50  
In these cases, the law of the nation governs State contracts.51 
This is not only supported by the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility, but also by tribunals’ case law.52  
Indicatively, in F. Wintershall A.G. v. Qatar,53 the Tribunal applied the 
gravity test and ruled that the law of Qatar was applicable.54 
Additionally, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”) reached the same conclusion in Société Ouest 
Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. Senegal, where the Tribunal 
considered that the law applicable “in respect of a project that was to 
take place in Senegal, can only be Senegalese law.”55  Notably, the 
ICSID Convention particularly regulates this matter in Article 42(1).56  
Article 41(1) provides, in the absence of a choice of law clause in the 
State Contract, the Tribunal will apply the “law of the Contracting State 
Party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and such 
rules of international law as may be applicable.”57  In fact, in Noble 
                                                          
48. See Stephen M. Schwebel, The Alsing Case, 8 INT’L & COMP. Q. 320, 324–
29 (where despite Greece’s argument that Greek law should apply to the loan 
agreement, the tribunal ruled in favor of the application of the law of the tribunal’s 
seat, as indirectly chosen by the parties along with the seat of the tribunal). But see 
T.W. Wälde, The Serbian Loans Case – A Precedent for Investment Treaty Protection 
of Foreign Debt?, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 4 (2004). 
49. KJOS, supra note 44, at 172.  
50. Report of the Comm. for the Study of International Loan Contracts, League 
of Nations Doc. II.A (1939).  
51. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 34, at 5.  
52. KJOS, supra note 44, at 173.  
53. F. Wintershall et al., v. A.G. v. Qatar, Partial Award of 5 February 1988 and 
Final Award of 31 May 1988, I.L.M. 795 (1989) (discussing a claim for expropriation 
of contractual rights by the Government of Qatar due to an alleged termination of an 
Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement).  
54. Id.  
55. Id. 
56. Id.   
57. Id.   
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Ventures Inc. v. Romania, the ICSID Tribunal explicitly stated there is 
a distinction between national law and international law,58 while in Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic, the Tribunal applied Islamic law 
as the relevant law.59 
Currently, the majority of sovereign bonds in Member States in the 
Eurozone are governed by the national law of their respective state as 
part of a choice of law clause.60  The graph below illustrates this:61 
 
 
 
                                                          
58. Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/1, Award, ¶ 53 
(Oct. 12, 2005). 
59. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. The Gov’t of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ports 
and Shipping Org., Award No. 135/33/1 (June 22, 1984). But see Anaconda-Iran, Inc. 
v. Iran and NICIC, Award No. 65/167/3 (Dec. 10, 1986) (where the ICSID Tribunal 
found that in the absence of a choice of law clause it could be inferred that that the 
parties had explicitly refuted the other party’s national law). 
60. Ignacio Tirado, Current EU Mechanisms to Confront Sovereign Insolvency, 
in SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON 
RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 317 (C.Espósito, Y. Li & Juan 
P. Bohoslavsky eds., 2013). 
61. Udaibir S. Das et al., Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950–2010: Concepts, 
Literature Survey, and Stylized Facts, 42 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
12/203, 2012). 
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It must be stated that in cases of sovereign bonds, applying the 
national law of the Debtor State can be highly prejudicial for investors’ 
rights, as the State will maintain the legislative power to amend the law 
and frustrate investors’ rights.62  This is what happened to the Greek 
Sovereign Bond Exchange.  On February 23, 2012, just days before the 
Exchange, Greece enacted the Greek Bondholders’ Law, No. 
4050/2012, which partially amended the terms of Greek sovereign 
bonds issued prior to December 31, 2011, by introducing Collective 
Action Clauses (“CACs”).63  These clauses allowed a two-thirds 
majority of the total number of Greek bondholders to bind all other 
bondholders with their decisions, and not allow individual investors to 
act solely by accelerating the bond or initiating litigation in the event of 
default.64 
B. International Law as Applicable 
The internalization of State contracts is another theory that has 
recently gained some traction.  Under this theory, international law 
automatically overrides State contracts, regardless of the national law 
provisions.65  Hence, regardless of the typical application of national 
law to a State contract, this cannot “entirely exclude the direct 
applicability of international law in certain situations.”66  Applying 
international law to override applicable national law is an important 
safeguard to investor’s rights.  Otherwise, a State may simply adjust its 
national law to benefit the State’s interests at the expense of the 
investor’s rights. 
                                                          
62. MICHAEL GRUSON & RALPH REISNER, SOVEREIGN LENDING: MANAGING 
LEGAL RISK (1984). 
63. See Rules Relating to the Adjustment of Securities their Issue or Guarantee 
by the Greek State with the Agreement of the Bondholders [Greek Bondholders’ Law] 
art. 1, Feb. 23, 2012 [EPHEMERIS TES KYVERNESEOS TES HELLENIKES DEMOKRATIAS] 
[E.K.E.D.] A:36, Feb. 23, 2012 (Greece). 
64. See Mitu Gulati & Lee C. Buchheit, How to Restructure Greek Debt, 9 
(Duke Law Working Paper, Paper No. 47, 2010),  
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2336. 
65. A.F.M. Maniruzzaman, State Contracts in Contemporary International 
Law; Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309 (2001). 
66. Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Award and Dissenting Opinion, ¶ 80 (1993). 
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To avoid such instances and ensure the application of international 
law, State contracts often provide “stabilization clauses,” which aim to 
make the terms of a state contract stable and fixed, not subject to 
changes by legislation or other means, and thus minimizing non-
commercial risks.67  For example, in Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. 
OPIC, the tribunal concluded, despite the prohibition of State 
executives to enter into agreements, under international law and the 
constitutional principle of separation of powers, the State contract was 
still valid and binding under public international law by virtue of a 
stabilization clause.68  Similarly, in Texaco Overseas Petroleum 
Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. The Government of 
the Libyan Arab Republic,69 the Tribunal held the contracts fell within 
the sphere of international law, and national regulatory measures, 
including nationalization, could not nullify the contracts.70 
Despite the importance of such clauses for enhanced protection of 
foreign investors from regulatory changes, such clauses are hardly, if at 
all, found in sovereign debt instruments. 
C. Choice of Law 
From a conflict of laws perspective, not all scholars favor the view 
that State contracts should be treated differently than private 
commercial agreements.  One such scholar, Phillip R. Wood, noted 
State contracts are not governed by specific rules and, therefore, the law 
of the State is not necessarily applicable.71  In accordance with the 
conflict of laws rules in most countries, in the event the contract 
contains a choice of law provision, such term will be upheld.72  
Indicatively, Article 1 of the International Law Institute’s Resolution, 
with respect to State contracts, provides State contracts “shall be 
                                                          
67. Lorenzo Cotula, Stabilization Clauses and the Evolution of Environmental 
Standards in Foreign Investment Contracts, 17 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 111, 120 (2006). 
68. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v. OPIC, AAA Award 17 I.L.M. 1321 (Aug. 
24, 1978).  
69. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. & California Asiatic Oil Co. v. Gov’t of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1 (1978). 
70. For an in-depth analysis, see A. A. Fatouros, International Law and the 
Internationalized Contract, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 134 (1980). 
71. See WOOD, supra note 35.  
72. See 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6. 
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subjected to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, failing such a 
choice, to the rules of law with which the contract has the closest 
link.”73  This seems to indicate the applicable law is not based on a new 
theory designed to extend the reach of international law or impose the 
application of the State’s national law to contracts concluded by States, 
but instead, by applying classical rules of private international law74 
whereby the parties’ choice would be prevalent. 
In such case, the starting point would be the will of the parties as 
expressed in the terms of the contract; in other words, the choice of law 
clauses are of utmost importance.  Indeed, arbitral tribunals, as well as 
national courts, will uphold the parties’ choice vis-a-vis applicable law, 
adhering to the universally accepted principle of the “proper law of the 
contract.”75  Such choice of law clauses are upheld, regardless of the 
provisions of the international private law of the State,76 as this is 
permissible under international law.77  Therefore, the law applicable to 
State contracts can be a law different than that of the national law of the 
State involved.78  This raises the question of which law can or should 
be chosen by the parties. 
Initially, the choice of enforcing another States’ national law 
appeared as an unpopular one, due to States’ unwillingness to submit to 
another State’s laws.  Only 10% of Greek bonds were governed by other 
national legislation (mostly English law) prior to introduction of the 
Greek Bondholders’ Act.79  This is what allowed the Greek government 
to retroactively introduce CACs to sovereign bonds governed by Greek 
Law, and to achieve high participation in the bond exchange.80  
                                                          
73. Wautelet, supra note 37.  
74. Joe Verhoeven, Droit international des contrats et droit des gens, REVUE 
BELGE DE DROIT INT’L 203 (1978-79) (Fr.). 
75. See Dalmia Dairy Industries v. Nat’l Bank of Pak., 1512 Int’l Chamber of 
Commerce, Arbitration Tribunal ¶ 130 (1976). 
76. JULIAN D.M. LEW, APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: A STUDY IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARDS, OCEANA 
PUBLICATIONS 96 (1978). 
77. R. D. BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS, 
AND COMMENTARY 259 (2005). 
78. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 284 
(2010). 
79. Gulati & Buchheit, supra note 64, at 2.  
80. See id. 
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However, the Greek Bondholders Law did not affect Greek sovereign 
bonds governed by foreign States.  Thus, bondholders of such foreign 
law bonds were able to reject the terms of the bond exchange and hold 
out instead.81  In fact, more than half of such bonds under English, 
Japanese, and Swiss law were not subject to the exchange and serviced 
according to their original terms.82  Similarly, other larger economy 
states within the EU, such as the UK and Germany, issue almost all 
their bonds under national law.83 
This raises the question: under which circumstances will a state 
accept to be subjected to a foreign state’s law?  The answer can be found 
by reviewing the present laws applicable to Greek sovereign bonds.  
After three years, Greece re-entered the capital markets on July 25, 
2017, by offering five-year sovereign bonds equal to €3 billion, all of 
which were governed by English law.84  In fact, Finland urged all EU 
members experiencing financial crisis to increase the number of foreign 
law bonds they would issue to remain attractive to investors in the 
capital markets.85  Similarly, States with smaller economies, where the 
domestic investor base is limited (i.e. Cyprus), tend to issue foreign law 
bonds to render their bonds more attractive to foreign investors who 
view foreign law as a security element.86  On the other hand, States with 
an abundance of domestic investors, mainly due to national financial 
stability and economic growth, tend to issue national law bonds.87  The 
prime example here is Germany.88  This goes to show that, although 
governments bonds are not negotiated, foreign investors may indirectly 
                                                          
81. Jeromin Zettelmeyer et al., The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy 25 
(PIIE Working Paper series WP 13-8 2013). 
82. M. Chamon et al., Foreign Law Bonds: Can They Reduce Sovereign 
Borrowing Costs 1 (Apr. 23, 2015), https://events.barcelonagse.eu/live/files/801-
icf15-chamonpdf. 
83. A. Clare & N. Schmidlin, The Impact of Foreign Governing Law on 
European Government Bond Yields (2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2406477 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406477. 
84. See Liz Alderman, In Sign of Progress for Greece, Investors Eagerly Snap 
Up New Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2017, at B7. 
85. See Chamon, supra note 82. 
86. Clare & Schmidlin, supra note 83. 
87. Id. 
88. R. W. KOLB, SOVEREIGN DEBT: FROM SAFETY TO DEFAULT 53 (2011). 
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avert pressure to secure better terms for their interests, but only when 
the interest from domestic investors is low.89 
To this end, currently a very large number of sovereign bonds 
worldwide are issued under foreign law.  Out of such bonds, New York 
or English law govern the large majority (approximately 90% of the 
foreign law bonds) because of an underlying choice of law provisions.90  
The choice of the applicable foreign law is important for many reasons.  
Primarily, because, in all likelihood, apart from choosing a foreign law 
as applicable to the bond contract, the courts of the said foreign State, 
whose law was chosen, will also be selected as competent.91 This is 
largely because foreign national courts are deemed to be in a better 
position to interpret and implement their own laws.92 
The competent courts are important not only for granting a 
favorable judgment for investors, but also for allowing investors to 
enforce such judgment.  Additionally, depending on the applicable law, 
bonds may or may not contain certain clauses or the interpretation of 
those clauses may be different from one jurisdiction to another.93  We 
shall explore below the treatment of the “pari passu” clause under 
United States and English Law. 
In sum, so long as the national law of the issuing state does not 
govern the contract terms, investors are somewhat safeguarded.  If 
foreign law governs the sovereign bonds, investors are able to resist a 
forced restructuring and hold out to insist on full repayment.94  This is 
similar to the foreign law bondholders in the Greek debt restructuring.  
It is for these reasons that in times of financial distress, foreign law 
bonds of distressed States are often sold at a premium.95 
                                                          
89. Clare & Schmidlin, supra note 83. 
90. Sovereign Debt Management Forum, WORLD BANK TREASURY, 2014, 
://treasury.worldbank.org/documents/BREAKOUTSESSION8final_1.pdf. See also 
KOLB, supra note 89; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 
52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997).  
91. FRANCESCO PARISI, PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 493 (2017). 
92. Id.  
93. Darius Miller & Natalia Reisel, Do Country Level Investor Protections 
Impact Security Level Contract Design? Evidence from Foreign Bond Covenants 
(May 25, 2011) (unpublished comment), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392990.  
94. See Chamon, supra note 82.  
95. Id. 
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D. Lex Fori 
Finally, in cases where state contracts, including sovereign bonds, 
have no underlying provisions regulating the choice of law, arbitral 
tribunals under ICSID, United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, and the International Chamber of Commerce adopt an 
almost identical simplified approach, provided the investment treaty 
contains arbitration clauses rendering one or more tribunals as 
competent to adjudicate a dispute stemming from a contract.96 In 
particular, if the investment treaty does not offer guidance on the 
applicable law for disputes between the host State and the investor, the 
tribunals will apply lex fori (i.e. the law applicable to the relevant 
tribunal).97 
In the case of Greece, contrary to the global Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (“BIT”) practice, most BITs signed by Greece do not contain a 
reference to ICSID, but provide for investor-State provisions that are 
purely ad hoc clauses.98  Accordingly, the Germany-Greece BIT 
specifically provides for the creation of an ad hoc arbitral body 
composed of three arbitrators, two of which are designated by each 
contracting party, while the third will be chosen by the two pre-selected 
arbitrators.99  BIT further provides that, if it does not become possible 
for the parties to choose the arbitrators, the President or the Vice 
President of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) will decide.100  In 
such cases, the rules of procedure for the steps to be followed are 
prescribed in the BIT text and the investors must act accordingly. 
                                                          
96. OLIVER DÖRR & KRISTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE 
LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY, SPRINGER SCIENCE & BUSINESS MEDIA 78 
(2011). 
97. Id.  
98. RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENTS 
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 129 
(2012). 
99. Bilateral Investment Treat, Germany-Greece, Mar. 27, 1961, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1329 (the treaty is not 
mapped, however, a German version of the treaty can be found at the aforementioned 
link).  
100. Id.  
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III. BASIC CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 
Apart from the above, applicable law is also of utmost importance 
in the interpretation of contractual terms, and thus, to investors’ cases 
for breach of contract.  To examine bondholders’ rights in cases of 
sovereign defaults, we must examine the common contractual terms 
found in sovereign bond contracts that may be affected from such 
default.  For the purposes of this Article, the analysis is limited to the 
clauses found in Greek Sovereign Bonds. 
A.  The “Pari Passu” Clause 
Sovereign Bond Contracts will, most likely, include a “pari passu” 
clause.  These clauses usually state that the bonds rank pari passu, 
which means there will not be any preference among bondholders and 
the other unsecured obligations of the issuer.101  Recently, in light of 
recent cases, the meaning of these clauses have puzzled both academia 
and practitioners.  Summarily, the “pari passu” clause has been 
interpreted in two ways: in a narrow sense, whereby all obligations 
assumed under the bond rank will rank pari passu with all other 
unsecured debt, and in a broad sense, if a debtor is unable to pay all its 
obligations, such obligations will be paid on a pro-rata basis.102 
The meaning of pari passu in the context of sovereign default was 
first examined in 1936, in the case of AB Obligations Interessenter v. 
Bank for International Settlements (“AB Obligations”).103 However, 
pari passu clauses were introduced in sovereign bonds as early as 
1871.104  In AB Obligations, the Swiss federal court, judging under 
Swiss law, had no difficulty interpreting the pari passu clause under the 
broad sense, as a promise that payment to investors would be made pro-
                                                          
101. Rodrigo Olivares-Camina, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt 
Instruments: Developments in Recent Litigation (BIS Papers No. 72, 2013), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap72u.pdf. 
102. Financial Markets Law Committee, Pari Passu Clauses, 79 F.M.L.C. 1, 2 
(2005).  
103. Aktiebolaget Obligations Interessenter v. Bank for Int’l Settlements, Swiss 
Fed. Tribunal (1936). 
104. Paolo Mauro et al., Emerging Market Spreads: Then Versus Now, 117 Q.J. 
ECON. 695, 695–96 (2002). 
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rata.105  However, despite this interpretation, the Swiss court was not 
willing to enforce such a finding.106  It was for this reason that the pari 
passu clauses, until recently, did not receive much attention, as they 
were considered “harmless relic[s] of historical evolution.”107  Still, the 
predominant belief amongst practitioners was the clause should be 
interpreted in the narrow sense. 
However, Elliott Associates v. Peru108 changed this belief by 
reaffirming the Swiss Court’s judgment.  There, the Court of Appeal of 
Brussels, examining New York law sovereign bonds, ruled investors 
could use the version of the clause, which used “payment” in relation 
to pari passu to effectively claim a State is not allowed to pay certain 
investors before it pays others.109  In fact, the Court of Appeal 
concluded the pari passu clause “has as a result that the debt should be 
paid down equally towards all creditors in proportion to their claim.”110  
To this end, the Court of Appeal granted injunctive relief to Elliot 
Associates.111  In turn, this barred Chase Manhattan and, most 
importantly, Euroclear from making interest payment on Peru’s Brady 
bonds to European bondholders, as Elliot Associates had a right of pro 
rate payment.112 Faced with a potential new default on its restructured 
Brady Bonds, Peru entered into an agreement and paid Elliott 
Associates in full.113 
                                                          
105. Anna Gelpern, Courts and Sovereigns in the Pari Passu Goldmines, 7 CAP. 
MKTS. L.J. 2 (2016). 
106. Id. at 3. 
107. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE 
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 46 (2013). 
108. Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeals], Brussels, 8 ch., 2000, Elliott 
Associates, L.P. v. Republic of Peru (2000) [hereinafter Elliot Associates, L.P.]. 
109. The wording of the 1983 sovereign bond contract provided, “The 
obligations of the Guarantor hereunder do rank and will rank at least pari passu in 
priority of payment with all other External Indebtedness of the Guarantor, and interest 
thereon.” Declaration of Professor A. F. Lowenfeld, ‘Il’ll I, 8, Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. 
Banco de la Nacion (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
110. Elliott Assocs., L.P., supra note 109,  ¶ 6. 
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliott 
Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 44 (2011). 
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Similarly, the District Courts of New York were asked to examine 
the meaning of the pari passu clause in the context of the recent 
Argentine sovereign default concerning bonds of over $100 billion.114  
The case, brought by NML Capital, an affiliate of Elliot Associates, 
dealt with sovereign issued bonds under a Fiscal Agency Agreement.  
Argentina was unable to fully repay the nominal value and interest of 
such bonds, amounting to approximately $1.33 billion.115 Accordingly, 
this resorted two offers to exchange bonds, whereby investors that held 
bonds under the Fiscal Agency Agreement could exchange their 
existing bonds for new, unsubordinated, and unsecured debt 
instruments of lesser value reduced at approximately a quarter of the 
original value.116 
To ensure the success of such bond exchanges, Argentina passed a 
law restricting payment to bonds that did not participate in the 
exchange.117  NML Capital argued this was breaching the pari passu 
obligations of Argentina under the sovereign bond contracts.118  The 
pari passu clause examined by the New York courts was two-pronged.  
The first prong related to the securities themselves, while the second 
prong related to the payment obligations of the Republic under the 
Securities.119  The District Court looking at the language of the clause, 
in line with United States standard legal principles of contract 
interpretation, noted the second prong of the clause meant Argentina 
was prohibited from making any payments on other bonds, unless 
                                                          
114. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Argentina’s 
‘Vulture Fund’ Crisis Threatens Profound Consequences for International Financial 
System (June 24, 2014), http://unctad.org/en/pages/ 
newsdetails.aspx?OriginalVersionID=783.  
115. Ricardo W. Beller & Agustina Ranieri, The PariPassu Clause As Applied 
In Argentina Sovereign Bonds Litigation, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Mar. 2013), 
https://www.financierworldwide.com/the-pari-passu-clause-as-applied-in-argentina-
sovereign-bonds-litigation/#.WcQFVbJJbIU.  
116. Id.  
117. Phillip Wood, The Pari Passu Clause and the Argentine Case, ALLEN & 
OVERY (Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.allenovery.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/ 
The%20pari%20passu%20clause%20and%20the%20Argentine%20case.pdf.  
118. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After 
NML v. Argentina, 12 CAP. MRKT. L. J. 224, 225 (2017).  
119. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 259 (2d Cir. 
2012).   
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payments were made also on the defaulted FAA bonds.120  As such, the 
Court concluded Argentina breached the pari passu clause.121  To reach 
such conclusion, the District Court relied solely on the wording of the 
clause and did not make any reference to previous case law.122  The 
results of this judgment were monumental for Argentina, because 
Argentina was essentially barred from issuing new bonds or servicing 
its restructured debt instruments.123 
Notably, the outcome of the above cases might have been different, 
had these been examined under English law.  Indeed, the Financial 
Markets Law Committee issued a report on the role and meaning of pari 
passu clauses under English law.124  The report was triggered after 
Elliott Associates v. Peru was decided, and the Committee noted, apart 
from the literal interpretation of the wording of the clause, the 
consequences of each interpretation should also be considered.125  To 
this end, the Committee noted that as “a matter of English law[,] the 
ranking (narrow) interpretation is the proper interpretation of the pari 
passu clause in sovereign debt obligations.”126 
In the context of the Greek sovereign bond restructuring, the 
majority of investors could not use such clauses because, with a few 
exceptions, almost all Greek-law governed bonds did not contain such 
pari passu clauses.127  Even in its newly issued English law bonds, that 
contain pari passu clauses, Greece has introduced specific wording to 
                                                          
120. Id. at 263. 
121. Id. at 265. 
122. Id. at 263. 
123. Bob Van Voris & Katia Porzecanski, Argentina Debt Injunction To Be 
Lifted In Blow To Hedge Funds, BLOOMBERG (2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/argentina-bonds-judge-says-
he-will-lift-injunctions-on-debt-iku9ykz3. 
124. Lord Brown-Wilkinson et al., Issue 79 – Pari Passu Clauses, Financial 
Markets Law Committee (Mar. 2005), http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/ 
6/5/8/26584807/79.pdf.  
125. Id. at 8.  
126. Id. at 25.  
127. Mitu Gulati & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Making a Voluntary Greek Debt 
Exchange Work, 7 (Jan. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Duke 
University).  
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol48/iss2/4
Argyropoulou camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/13/2018  4:32 PM 
2018] SOVEREIGN BOND RESTRUCTURING  267 
avert the broad interpretation of such clauses.128  Greece specifically 
denounced the pro rata payment to bondholders in line with the new 
pari passu model clause proposed by the International Capital Market 
Association (“ICMA”).129  The ICMA’s proposed clause aims to 
exclude a pro-rata interpretation of the pari passu clause issuing explicit 
language to this end.  In particular, the proposed clause reads: 
The Notes are the direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of 
the Issuer and rank pari passu, without preference among 
themselves, with all other unsecured External Indebtedness of the 
Issuer, from time to time outstanding, provided, however, that the 
Issuer shall have no obligation to effect equal or rateable payment(s) 
at any time with respect to any such other External Indebtedness and, 
in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External 
Indebtedness at the same time or as a condition of paying sums due 
on the Notes and vice versa.130 
Hence, although pari passu clauses can protect some investors 
(usually the holdouts), they are not always present in sovereign bonds.  
Moreover, even when such clauses do exist, wording and applicable law 
can diminish their broad interpretation despite the holdout’s aspirations.  
A limited interpretation was required to facilitate sovereign bond 
restructurings and, therefore, allow non-holdout bondholders to receive 
some compensation on their bonds.131  It also served to limit the wide 
powers creditors enjoyed by holdouts under the broad interpretation of 
the clause.132  This limitation prevented creditors from holding States 
hostage in a state of financial duress.133 
                                                          
128. See James A Haley, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, a Coasean Perspective, 
in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES 164 
(2016). 
129. Id. 
130. Gregory Makoff & Robert Kahn, Sovereign Bond Contract Reform 
Implementing the New ICMA Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses, 56 CIGI 
PAPERS 5 (Feb. 2015).  
131. William Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational 
Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823, 833 (2004).  
132. Id.  
133. See id. at 849. 
21
Argyropoulou: Sovereign Bond Restructuring from a Contractual Perspective, Cave
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2018
Argyropoulou camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/13/2018  4:32 PM 
268 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48 
B.  Collective Action Clauses 
As demonstrated in the case of Argentina, holdout creditors can 
have negative implications, not only for the State and its ability to issue 
new bonds, but also for the entire restructuring process and, therefore, 
for other bondholders.134  To this end, an effective tool to minimize 
hold-out creditors are Collective Action Clauses (“CACs”).135 
CACs take various forms, but despite their form they all aim to 
resolve coordination problems between bondholders, especially in 
times of bond restructuring.136  CACs can be in the form of collective 
modification clauses, which allow a qualified majority of bondholders 
to decide for all bondholders, including dissenting bondholders.137  
CACs can also be in the form of acceleration clauses, whereby 
bondholders can accelerate or initiate legal action against the State only 
after a qualified majority of the bondholders have consented to this.138  
Additionally, there are other less prominent forms of CACs, such as 
representation clauses, aggregation clauses, and sharing clauses.139 
The importance of CACs was demonstrated after the peso crisis in 
Mexico, where CACs were promoted as a contractual tool to facilitate 
sovereign debt restructurings and eliminate the increasing cost of 
adjudication.140  A result, in 1995, the Ministers and G10 countries 
formed a working group to study sovereign defaults and the problems 
                                                          
134. See Benu Schneider, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Road Ahead, in 
LIFE AFTER DEBT: THE ORIGINS AND RESOLUTIONS OF DEBT CRISIS 199 (J. Stiglitz et 
al. eds., 2014).  
135. Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign 
Debt, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 195, 206–11 
(2008). 
136. See Michael Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the 
Eurozone, 18 REV. FIN. 1, 1–2 (2013).  
137. Mitu Gulati et al., A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, 54 VA. 
J. INT’L L. 52, 53 (2013).  
138. Id.  
139. Sean Hagan, supra note 135, at 205. Collective Action Clauses in 
International Sovereign Bond Contracts and Their Effect on Spreads at Issuance, 5 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with American Economic Association).  
140. Sönke Haeseler, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign 
Bond Contracts – Whence the Opposition?, 23 J. ECON. SURVEYS 882, 882–84 (2007).  
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faced in the aforementioned context.141  The Group issued its report in 
1996 and noted that introducing CACs into sovereign bond contracts 
might prove beneficial in smoothing negotiations during sovereign debt 
crises.142  However, despite the Group’s recommendation, States met 
CACs with hesitation, and CACs were entirely absent in bonds issued 
under local law.143  Indicatively, before January 2013, the vast majority 
of sovereign bond contacts issued by Eurozone members were 
governed by each State’s national law and did not contain CACs.144 
Greece was not an exception to this rule.  As indicated above, 
before the adoption of the Greek Bondholders’ Law, No. 4050/2012, 
the Greek sovereign bonds contained no collective action clauses, and 
instead, Greece unilaterally introduced such clauses retroactively by the 
Greek Bondholders’ Law.  The revision of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Stability Mechanism was led in part by the unilateral 
modification of Eurozone sovereign bonds’ terms as a result of the 
issuing state’s legislative intervention.145  The treaty provides the model 
CAC, developed by a sub-committee of the Economic and Financial 
Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, would be mandatorily 
included in all Eurozone sovereign bonds with a maturity of greater than 
one year issued as of January 1, 2013.146  According to Gelpern and 
Gulati, this revision was enacted for two main reasons.147  First, the 
bonds needed to inspire security to investors that such unilateral acts, 
as that of the Greek Government, would not take place again in the 
                                                          
141. John Drage & Catherine Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses (CACS): 
An Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues, BANK OF ENGL. 
1 (2004), www.finanzaonline.com/forum/attachments/ obbligazioni-titoli-di-
stato/1986399d1414067331-venezuela-2027-us922646as37-vol-27-il-ritorno-dagli-
inferi-cac.pdf.   
142. Id.  
143. Christian Hofmann, Sovereign-Debt Restructuring in Europe Under the 
New Model Collective Action Clauses, 49 TEX. INT’L. L. J. 383, 390 (2014). 
144. Elena Carletti et al., The Price of Law: The Case of the Eurozone Collective 
Action Clauses, 3 (July 5, 2017) (unpublished comment) (on file with Duke 
University).  
145. Collective Action Clauses In Euro Area, ECON. & FIN. COMM., 
https://europa.eu/efc/collective-action-clauses-euro-area_en (last updated May 23, 
2018).  
146. Id.  
147. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, The Wonder-Clause, 41 J. COMP. L. 367 
(2013).  
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future and bondholders could rely on the terms of the sovereign bond 
contracts.148  Second, CACs have the ability to reduce bailouts because 
defaulting states would have the ability to restructure their debts.149 
Similarly, in 2014 the International Monetary Fund and ICMA both 
stressed the importance of CAC in facilitating the restructuring 
processes and, to this end, suggested the reformation of sovereign bond 
contacts.150  In fact, ICMA published proposed terms for aggregated 
CACs, which was revised again in May 2015.151 
Now, we will briefly review the model CAC introduced in 
sovereign bonds in the Eurozone and shall explore if this can facilitate 
future investors’ rights.  Primarily, the model CAC is mandatorily 
applicable to bonds issued both internationally and domestically, 
regardless if offered in the stock market or privately, and it can refer to 
a single bond or series of bonds.152  The model CAC sets a series of 
processes that need to be followed before adopting a binding 
modification on all bondholders.153 
The model CAC distinguishes between reserved matters, pertaining 
to the most crucial bond terms, such as the payment date, interest rate, 
and non-reserved matters that relate to less crucial bond terms.154  
Regarding amendments of a reserved matter, a meeting of bondholders 
should be duly convened, in which bondholders holding at least 75% of 
the aggregate principal amount of outstanding bonds should vote in 
favor of the amendment.155  The percentage drops to 66.66% of the 
aggregate principal amount of outstanding bonds in cases of written 
                                                          
148. Id. 
149. Id.   
150. Stefanescu, supra note 31, at 14. 
151. Sovereign Debt Information, INT’L CAP. MKT. ASS’N, 
https://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information (last visited May 
22, 2018).  
152. Mairéad N. Dhonncha, EU Publishes Mandatory Collective Action Clause 
for Use in Eurozone Sovereign Bonds from 1 January 2013, LINKLATERS (May 2012), 
https://www.investireoggi.it/forums/attachments/clientmemo-pdf.245501/.  
153. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 136. 
154. EFC Sub-Committee on EU Sovereign Debt Markets, Model Collective 
Action Clause Supplemental Explanatory Note, EUROPA 2 (Mar. 26, 2012), 
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/supplemental_explanatory_note_on_the_model_c
ac_-_26_march_2012.pdf.   
155. Id.  
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resolutions.156  On the contrary, an amendment of a non-reserved matter 
can be achieved by the positive vote of bondholders holding more than 
50% of the aggregate principal amount of outstanding bonds present.  
This can be done either at a duly convened meeting or in the form of 
written resolution.157  The model CAC also provides rules for the 
conveyance of the bondholders’ meetings as well as the procedure to be 
followed during the meeting. 
As explained above, the introduction of CACs in sovereign bonds 
is a step in the right direction for both defaulting States and 
bondholders.  However, CACs primarily protect bondholders.  
Significantly, the latter can now facilitate debt restructuring 
negotiations, take binding decisions on issues that have a crucial 
bearing on the restructuring process, and reduce the threat of holdouts 
that may lead to the inability of all other bondholders to collect, even 
partially.158  Indeed, even in the Greek debt restructuring, without the 
introduction of CACs, the restructuring of the sovereign debt might not 
have been possible.159  This could have led to Greece’s unregulated 
default. 
Although the Greek debt restructuring CACs allowed the 
successful completion of the restructuring, the bondholders sustained 
significant losses, which raises the question of whether there is a 
contractual term that may address such losses.  To this end, we shall 
explore the use of “Events of Default” clauses in such cases. 
C.  Events of Default 
The “Events of Default” clause is particularly important to 
bondholders, because it allows them to accelerate the maturity of their 
bonds and take enforcement measures over the issuer’s assets in 
                                                          
156. Id.  
157. Common Terms Of Reference, ECON. & FIN. COMM. (Feb. 17, 2012), 
https://europa.eu/efc/sites/efc/files/docs/pages/cac_-_text_model_cac.pdf.  
158. J.F. Hornbeck, Argentina’s Defaulted Sovereign Debt: Dealing with 
Holdouts, Congressional Research Service CONG. RES. SERV.  (Feb. 6, 2013), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41029.pdf.  
159. Antonia E. Stolper & Sean Dougherty, Collective Action Clauses: How the 
Argentina Litigation Changed the Sovereign Debt Markets, 12 CAP. MKT. L.J. 239 
(2017).  
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satisfaction of their claims.160  In other words, bondholders may initiate 
proceedings against the issuing state to recover the nominal value of the 
bond plus interest only when an event of default occurs.  When a default 
occurs, bondholders would be able to accelerate all amounts owed 
under the sovereign bond contract.  Notably, however, bondholders 
rarely choose such acceleration as a result of an event of default.  
Instead, in most cases, bondholders will refer to an event of default to 
improve their bargaining power, however small that power may be.161  
Although bondholders have the right to accerelate and remove the 
issuing state’s assets in default, they may not simply select this right.162  
Instead, they often enter into negotiations with the issuing state 
regarding modifying the contract terms, without forefeiting their right 
to accerelate and enforce their claims.163 
As to what constitutes a default will depend on the wording of each 
sovereign bond contract.  There are two broad types of defaults.  The 
first includes instances of non-payment of amounts due.164  The second 
refers to certain events of anticipatory non-payment.165  Indicatively, 
the majority of Greek sovereign bonds prior to the 2012 restructuring 
would include the following definition of an event of default: 
• failure to pay interest or principal (usually after a 30-day 
grace period); 
• failure or other covenant obligation (usually a grace period 
is granted, and notice of default is required); 
• a government order or presidential decree is issued 
preventing Greece from performing its obligations under 
the bonds; or 
                                                          
160. Mitu Gulati & George Triantis, Contracts Without Law: Sovereign Versus 
Corporate Debt, 75 UNIV. CIN. L. REV. 999 (2007).  
161. Phillip Wood, How protective are Ukraine’s international bonds?, ALLEN 
& OVERY 8 (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.allenovery.com/ 
SiteCollectionDocuments/GLIU_-_Ukraine_international_bonds_(Mar_2014).pdf.  
162. YAN LIU, Collective Action Clauses in International Sovereign Bonds 
(IMF Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses, 2002).  
163. Id.  
164. VINOD AGARWAL, Negotiating and Drafting Clauses in Loan Agreements: 
Events of Default 5 (U.N. Inst. for Training & Res., 2001).   
165.  Id.  
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• a General Moratorium is declared on non-payment of 
principal.166 
Therefore, the question that arises is when the sovereign bond 
restructuring may constitute a default.  Notably, although the two terms 
intertwine, they are not identical.  Generally, an event of default will 
precede a sovereign restructuring.167  Indeed, when an event of default 
is directly linked to non-payment after the grace period has expired, a 
restructuring is required.168  However, in the case of the Greek 
sovereign bond restructuring of 2012, there was no missed payment on 
the side of Greece vis-a-vis bondholders.169  However, what is of 
interest is whether the unilateral introduction of CACs can prevent 
Greece from performing its obligations under the bonds.170 
A similar issue was addressed by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (“ISDA”), which examined whether the 
unilateral introduction of CACs, by the Bondholders’ Law, was a 
“credit event” in the context of marketed credit default swaps (“CDS”).  
Although credit events are not limited to the types of defaults listed 
above, it is important to review how ISDA treated the Greek sovereign 
bond restructuring.  Primarily, ISDA took the view that given the 
voluntary nature of the bond exchange, the latter did not constitute a 
credit event.171  According to ISDA, if the bond restructuring is 
voluntary, no credit event takes place.172  This reasoning does not stem 
from the CDS definitions, which make no distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary events.  Rather, this argument derives from the 
purposive interpretation of restructuring, which intends to refer to an 
event binding on all bondholders, even those dissenting to it.173  On 
these grounds, ISDA ruled the Greek restructuring of 2011 was not 
                                                          
166. See, e.g., Hellenic Republic, OFFERING CIRCULAR (Feb. 21, 2005), 
http://s3cdn.observador.pt/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/greece-ecb-bond1.pdf.  
167. Das, supra note 61.  
168. AGARWAL, supra note 164. 
169. Agustino Fontevecchia, ISDA Says Greece in Default, CDS Will Trigger, 
FORBES (Mar. 9, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/ 2012/03/09/on-
greece-defaults-and-the-future-of-derivatives/#15e8e3ae69fd.  
170. See Greek Sovereign Debt Q&A (Update), ISDA (July 25, 2011), 
http://www2.isda.org/news/greek-sovereign-debt-qampa-update.  
171. Id.  
172. Id.  
173. Id.  
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likely to entail payments under CDS contracts.174  On the contrary, in 
2012, ISDA concluded the introduction of CACs by Greece unilaterally 
amending the terms of Greek law governed bonds constituted a 
Restructuring Credit Event.175  Thus, the CACs rendered the sovereign 
bond restructuring binding on all bondholders of Greek-law governed 
bonds, even those that dissent.176 
Despite this determination within the CDS context, contractually, 
it is unlikely the unilateral introduction of CACs could constitute a 
default and, therefore, be in a position to award bondholders an 
additional card on the restructuring negotiation table.  Indeed, given the 
nature of CACs clauses, these do not constitute a change in the bond’s 
payment terms, nor did they prevent Greece from performing its 
obligations under the bonds.  Instead, it appears in the context of the 
Greek sovereign debt restructuring, the introduction of CACs was used 
to avert an event of default by Greece. 
D.  Other Clauses 
Other clauses that can usually be found in sovereign bonds include 
clauses such as “negative pledge clauses”177 that prohibit the issuance 
of new collateralized debt, unless existing debt is enhanced in the same 
way.  Additionally, “secured debt clauses”178 and “cross default 
clauses”179 define a default event as a State’s default on another 
government bond. 
Prior to the Greek sovereign debt restructuring of 2012, Greek 
Bonds did not provide any security or other guarantees for the 
                                                          
174. Id.  
175. ISDA EMEA Determinations Committee: Restructuring Credit Event Has 
Occurred with Respect to the Hellenic Republic (Mar. 9, 2012), 
https://www.isda.org/2012/03/09/isda-emea-determinations-committee-
restructuring-credit-event-has-occurred-with-respect-to-the-hellenic-republic/.  
176. Id.   
177. MAURO MEGLIANI, SOVEREIGN DEBT: GENESIS - RESTRUCTURING – 
LITIGATION 179 (2014).  
178. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS 
AND LESSONS FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 62 (2006).  
179. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & Eric. A. Posner, The Evolution of 
Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 139 (2012).   
28
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2 [2018], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol48/iss2/4
Argyropoulou camera ready (Do Not Delete) 7/13/2018  4:32 PM 
2018] SOVEREIGN BOND RESTRUCTURING  275 
satisfaction of creditors in case of default.180  In addition, they did not 
entail negative pledge clauses protecting the bondholders who took out 
an unsecured loan.181  Negative pledge clauses provide a State that has 
awarded unsecured loans, cannot subsequently take out other loan(s) 
with a different lender, securing the subsequent loan(s) by the same 
specified assets.182  Use of the same assets as collateral would mean that 
the original lender would be disadvantaged because the subsequent 
lender may have a priority position to satisfy his claim by the assets in 
an event of default. 
Following the restructuring, however, this has changed.  Indeed, the 
bonds that were offered to bondholders at the time of the restructuring 
contained negative pledge clauses, preventing Greece from issuing any 
secured bonds for as long as any of the restructured bonds remained 
outstanding.183  Interestingly, in the bonds issued during the 2012 Greek 
bond exchange, a wider definition of a default event was adopted, 
including any failure by the issuing state to comply with any of the 
covenants contained in the new bonds, subject to a thirty-day cure 
period.184  Hence, a violation of the negative pledge clause would, 
under the new exchanged bonds, also constitute an event of default. 
Thus, such clause may be a useful tool for investors’ protection in 
case of future default, but such clauses are not relevant for investors’ 
rights prior to the 2012 restructuring. 
E.  Waiver of Immunity Clauses 
One of the most important clauses for bondholders’ protection is 
the clause that specifically waives an issuing state’s immunity for 
jurisdiction and enforcement.185  Enforcement is the motive for 
investors to pursue their claims against the Host State.186  Although it 
is a result of the judicial process, enforcement against States is neither 
                                                          
180. See Zettelmeyer, supra note 82; see also K. A. LAVDAS ET AL., STATENESS 
AND SOVEREIGN DEBT: GREECE IN THE EUROPEAN CONUNDRUM 125 (2013).  
181. LAVDAS, supra note 180, at 125.  
182. Id.  
183. Id.  
184. Id.  
185. Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 179, at 139.  
186. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment 
Law, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 155 (2007).   
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easy nor common.  Indeed, up to the mid-twentieth century, courts and 
scholars treated claims under sovereign bonds as unenforceable.187  
Accordingly, in the English case of Twycross v. Dreyfus,188 Sir George 
Jessel noted sovereign bonds are only “engagements of honour” and not 
enforceable contractual obligations as no tribunal would enforce them 
absent the consent of the issuing state.189  Historically, States used to 
enjoy absolute immunity; however, since the late twentieth century, 
there has been a shift from States’ absolute immunity to relative 
immunity.190 
Here, we must distinguish between immunity from jurisdiction and 
immunity from enforcement.  The former provides that the national 
courts of a foreign state do not have jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit against 
another state, unless the latter has so consented.191  On the other hand, 
immunity from enforcement restricts the powers of national courts or 
other organs of the state against the property of another state found in 
its jurisdiction.192  Absolute immunity provided States with immunity 
from foreign jurisdiction and enforcement,193 while relative immunity 
provides that when a sovereign chooses to enter the international 
marketplace and act as a commercial actor, it cannot escape liability 
through invoking sovereign immunity, but instead shall be similarly 
accountable to the judicial process similar to other commercial 
actors.194 
The Courts of Germany, in the context of the Greek Sovereign 
Bond Exchange, recently examined the issue of immunity from 
                                                          
187. CHRISTIAN TIETJE, THE RULE OF LAW IN MONETARY AFFAIRS: TAKING 
STOCK 14 (Thomas Cottier et al., eds., 2014).   
188. Twycross v. Dreyfus (1877) 5 Ch D at 605 (Eng.).  
189. Id.  
190. W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt and the 
“Contracts Matter” Hypothesis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
(forthcoming).  
191. August Reinisch, European Court Practice Concerning State Immunity 
from Enforcement Measures, 17 EUR. J. INT. LAW 803, 806 (2006).  
192. Id. at 803. 
193. Id. at 804.  
194. Lee Buchheit, Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Legal Context 107 (BIS 
Papers No. 72, 2013).  
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jurisdiction.195  Several German bondholders that acquired Greek 
sovereign bonds from German Banks in Germany resorted to German 
Courts to enforce actions against Greece claiming damages for the 
unilateral introduction of CACs in their bonds that led to them 
sustaining a haircut on their bonds.196  Bondholders’ claims were raised 
on two bases.  First, a claim, based on tort, asserted the bond exchange 
was a wrongful exchange.197  Second, bondholders raised claims for 
breach of contract.198  In all cases, German Courts examined whether 
they were barred from hearing any claims against the Greek state by 
virtue of sovereign immunity. 
Per German law, sovereign immunity does not apply to a State’s 
commercial acts; in other words, immunity will only apply when a State 
is acting as sovereign.199  Hence, the German courts examined whether 
bondholders’ claims related to sovereign or commercial acts.200  Based 
on this, the Federal Court of Justice concluded that claims in tort were 
inadmissible.201  The Greek Bondholders Law and the Council of 
Ministers’ subsequent decision to ratify the majority vote and extend its 
binding result on all bondholders were acts taken by Greece as a 
sovereign and, therefore, sovereign immunity applied.202  However, the 
Court noted this was not necessarily the case for claims brought for 
breach of contract.203 
Indeed, when German Courts examined bondholders’ claims for 
breach of contract, two Higher Regional Courts in Oldenburg and 
Cologne noted that no sovereign immunity was applicable as the claims 
stemmed from a contractual relation and the Greek Bondholders’ Law 
                                                          
195. See Sebastian Grund, The Legal Consequences of Sovereign Insolvency – 
A Review of Creditor Litigation in Germany Following the Greek Debt Restructuring, 
MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. (forthcoming).  
196. Id. at 18–21.  
197. Id. at 25.  
198. Id. at 43.  
199. HAZEL FOX & PHILIPPA WEBB, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 223–30 (2d 
ed. 2008).  
200. See Grund, supra note 195, at 13.  
201. Id. at 28.  
202. Richard M. Buxbaum, Sovereign Debtors Before Greece: The Case of 
Germany, 65 KAN. L.R. 101, 101–03 (2017). 
203. Id. at 122.   
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could not change this.204  However, the Schleswig Higher Regional 
Court contested that the significant point was not the non-payments by 
the Greek State, but the introduction of the Bondholders’ Law, which 
was in fact a sovereign act.205  As per the Schleswig Court, the issue in 
question was whether the introduction of CACs by the Bondholders’ 
Law was legal, and whether examining the legality of foreign 
legislative acts was within the scope of immunity.206  In all cases, 
however, German Courts did not proceed to examine the merits of the 
case, as even the Courts in Cologne and Oldenburg dismissed 
bondholders’ claims as the Courts did not have jurisdiction under the 
old Brussels Regulation (EC) 44/2001.207  
The scope and extent of State Immunity regarding enforcement is 
far more disputed than jurisdictional immunity, and there is no uniform 
global practice.  Different States have adopted different approaches, 
and the practice of national Courts in Europe is anything but uniform in 
this field.208  Nevertheless, some common elements have emerged as 
most States have abandoned the notion of absolute sovereign immunity 
against enforcement and have adopted a more limited application of the 
aforementioned relative immunity doctrine. 
Specifically, one of the most decisive factors to determine the 
extent of immunity from enforcement is the prevailing purpose of the 
property against which enforcement measures are sought.209  Indeed, in 
the Philippine Embassy Bank Account Case, the German Constitutional 
Court stated that: 
                                                          
204. Id. 
205. Wolf Bussian & Jan Erik Windthrost, Germany: German Courts Dismiss 
Greek Government Bondholders’ Claims Against Greece on State Immunity or 
Jurisdiction Grounds, ALLEN & OVERY, http://www.allenovery.com/ publications/en-
gb/lrrfs/continental%20europe/Pages/German-courts-dismiss-Greek-government-
bondholders-claims-against-Greece-on-state-immunity-or-jurisdiction-grounds.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2018).  
206. Id.  
207. Sebastian Grund, Enforcing Sovereign Debt in Court – A Comparative 
Analysis of Litigation and Arbitration Following the Greek Debt Restructuring of 
2012, 1 U. VIENNA L. REV. 34, 34–90 (2017).   
208. See Reinisch, supra note 193.   
209. Leo J. Bouchez, The Nature and Scope of State Immunity from Jurisdiction 
and Execution, 10 NETHERLANDS Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 17 (1979).  
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There is a general rule of international law that execution by the State 
having jurisdiction on the basis of a judicial writ of execution against 
a foreign State, issued in relation to non-sovereign action (acta iure 
gestionis) of that State upon that State’s things located or occupied 
within the national territory of the State having jurisdiction, is 
inadmissible without assent by the foreign State, insofar as those 
things serve sovereign purposes of the foreign State at the time of 
commencement of the enforcement measure.210 
As evidenced by the aforementioned decision, differences exist 
between property for sovereign purposes that is immune from 
execution/enforcement and property for non-sovereign/commercial 
purposes that are not immune.  This distinction is also found in the case 
law of other European countries, such as Spain, Italy, and the 
Netherlands.211  This principal was also upheld in a Belgian judgment, 
while even Swiss Courts that used to deny absolute immunity have now 
accepted that, only, property used for commercial purposes may be the 
object of execution.212  France also acknowledges the distinction 
between property used for sovereign purposes and property used for 
private/commercial purposes; however, it requires a link between the 
property against which execution is sought and the original claim is 
established.213  The link need not be proven if the property is public but 
not sovereign. 
Another limitation to the doctrine of immunity from enforcement 
is the private law characterization of the transaction.214  French Law 
goes even further granting immunity only if the State’s act is either an 
act of Government (“acte de puissance publique”) or if it is carried out 
for public interest (“dansl’intérêt d’un service public”).215  Notably, 
States could easily invoke the aforementioned doctrine to avoid their 
obligations stemming from arbitral awards; any action taken against 
                                                          
210. 46 BVERFGE 46, 342 2 BVM 1/76 “Philippine Embassy” (Ger.).  
211. Reinisch, supra note 193.  
212. Id.  
213. VINCENT HEUZÉ & PIERRE MAYER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 323 (L.G.D.J. 
ed., 2007).  
214. D. Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government 
Controlled Investors (OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2010/02, 
2010), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2010_2.pdf. 
215. HEUZÉ & MAYER, supra note 213, at 325.  
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them and, in this case against Greece, would be without any purpose.  
Therefore, a State that successfully relies on State Immunity to prevent 
enforcement may be in violation of its obligation under Bilateral or 
Multilateral Investment Treaties, as well as European Law.216  
However, in cases of extreme financial distress, as in the case of Greece 
in 2012, where imminent default and collapse of the financial system 
was pending, it appears that Greece’s actions were in fact for the public 
interest. 
In the case of ICSID adjudication, as in the case of Argentina, it 
would be a treaty violation for a Contracting State to refuse to enforce 
an award.217  It would also be non-compliant with Article 54, which 
would then carry the consequences of State responsibility, including the 
revival of diplomatic protection under Article 27(1) of the ICSID 
Convention.218 On account of the above, it comes as no surprise that 
since ICSID’s creation, all countries, with the exception of Argentina, 
have complied with their obligation to pay an arbitral award once its 
determination was finalized. 
To address the issue and award bondholders’ security that they 
would be entitled to enforce their claims in the case of default, new 
bonds contain a waiver clause for both immunity from enforcement and 
judgment.  Accordingly, the bond issued in 2015 provided: 
 
13. Waiver of Immunity 
(a) The Republic hereby irrevocably waives, to the extent permitted 
by applicable law and international conventions;  
(i) any immunity from jurisdiction it may have in any Proceeding 
in the courts of England; and  
                                                          
216. See Michel Tison, Who’s Afraid of Peter Paul? The European Court of 
Justice to Rule on Banking Supervisory Liability, THE FIN. REG. (Dec. 2004), 
http://www.law.ugent.be/fli/wps/pdf/WP2004-11.pdf (although in such instance it 
was found that invoking state immunity was not a violation of German Constitutional 
and EU law).  
217. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States art. 53, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
218. See Stanimir Alexandrov, Enforcement of ICSID Awards: Articles 53 and 
54 of the ICSID Convention, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 322, 326 (Christina Binder 
et al., eds., 2009).   
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(ii) except as provided below, any immunity from attachment or 
execution to which its assets or property might otherwise be entitled in 
any Proceeding in the courts of England, and agrees that it will not 
claim any such immunity in any such Proceeding. 
(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, the above waiver shall not 
constitute a waiver of immunity from attachment or execution with 
respect to: 
i. assets and property of the Republic located in the Republic; 
ii. the premises and property of the Republic’s diplomatic and 
consular missions; 
iii. assets and property of the Republic outside the Republic not 
used or intended to be used for a commercial purpose; 
iv. assets and property of the Republic’s central bank or monetary 
authority; 
v. assets and property of a military character or under the control of 
a military authority or defense agency of the Republic; or 
vi. assets and property forming part of the cultural heritage of the 
Republic. 
(c) For the purposes of the foregoing, “property” includes, without 
limitation, accounts, bank deposits, cash, revenues, securities and 
rights, including rights against third parties. 
(d) The foregoing constitutes a limited and specific waiver by the 
Republic solely for the purposes of the Notes, and under no 
circumstance shall it be construed as a general waiver by the Republic 
or a waiver with respect to proceedings unrelated to the Notes. 219  
Thus, immunity waiver clauses are important tools in the protection 
of sovereign bondholders in case of sovereign default, although 
insufficient on their own.  Moreover, although the vast majority of 
sovereign bonds currently contain these immunity waiver clauses, as 
pointed out by Professor Weidemaier, it has not “played much of a role 
in the broader drama of sovereign debt.”220 
CONCLUSION 
Sovereign bonds, despite their particular nature of being contracts 
with the sovereign, nonetheless continue to be contracts.  To this end, 
                                                          
219. Hellenic Republic, supra note 166. 
220. Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 112.  
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the terms included in such contracts are of importance, especially in 
cases of sovereign debt restructuring or sovereign default.  Recent 
caselaw on sovereign defaults have illustrated this importance.  
Although, undoubtedly in some cases, a default event will occur and 
political concerns will also come into play, contractual terms are still 
important.  Perhaps, the most important clause in a sovereign bond 
contract is the choice of law, as it has wide ramifications on the entire 
interpretation of the sovereign bond contract.  Traditionally, states used 
to “impose” their own national law, as this granted them power to 
control their debt.  Indeed, in cases where the governing law of a 
sovereign bond contract is that of the issuing state, then the latter retains 
the power to change that law to its favour. 
This is what happened during the Greek Sovereign Debt 
Restructuring in 2012, when Greece adopted the Bondholder’s Law, 
unilaterally amending the terms of the sovereign bonds’ contracts by 
the introduction of CACs that made the bondholder majority’s 
resolution for restructuring binding even on dissenting bondholders.  
Prior to 2012, Greek bonds were issues under Greek law and contained 
no standard creditor protection clauses, such as pari passu, secured 
debt, CAS, negative pledge or immunity waiver clauses. 
However, since 2012, there has been a significant change in the 
terms of sovereign bonds issued by the Greek Government.  New bonds 
are issued under English law and contain pari passu, negative pledges, 
and immunity waiver clauses.  Moreover, responding to the Greek 
unilateral amendment of the sovereign bond contract’s terms in 2012, 
the Eurozone has requested that all Euro-denominated sovereign bonds 
contain CACs.  This reformation of contractual terms was brought 
about to restore investors’ faith in Greek bonds and demonstrate the 
importance and power of contractual terms. 
Although holders of Greek sovereign bonds have not been 
successful in claiming damages due to the Greek Bond Restructuring of 
2012, recent changes to bond terms strongly reinforced their positions.  
In the unfortunate event of a new sovereign bond restructuring or a 
future sovereign default, investor’s rights will be better protected from 
negotiation to actual contract enforcement. 
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